This article was a case study on ONPS International Summer School, a private university-level program at Jinan University in Guangzhou, China where I worked in 2012. This essay is an excerpt from my book Academic Capitalism in China: Higher Education or Fraud?, which was originally published in 2013. In the book, I changed the name of ONPS to China X program for legal purposes. I gave my data to The Chronicle of Higher Education and they sent reporters to China to independently verify my account and they did their own original research on the topic, which was published by Beth McMurtrie and Lara Farrar as "Chinese Summer Schools Sell Quick Credits." Chronicle of Higher Education (Jan 14, 2013)
“This program is a business to make profit.”
Higher Education in China
In East Asia, state sponsored education and a cultural emphasis on credentialed knowledge workers have both been venerated traditions for thousands of years. In what is often called Chinese “Confucian” culture, education has been revered as a time-honored process of transmitting the collected wisdom of Chinese civilization – one of the oldest civilizations on Earth.[i] Academic degrees have been the primary markers of social distinction and economic mobility for over two thousand years. The hereditary locus of aristocratic power became blended with a meritocratic educated bureaucracy, which together created a “mixed aristocratic/bureaucratic ruling class.”[ii]
For much of the past two millennia of human history, China was “the most literate and numerate society in the world.”[iii] Educational institutions stressed rote memorization of the Chinese language, classical Chinese texts, ritualized socialization, writing, and the arts. [iv] And while Confucian and neo-Confucian educational principles did stress individual development as “self-cultivation,” the emphasis of formal schooling, especially in later neo-Confucian institutions, focused more on situating the individual within the hierarchical “structure” of society. Thus, much of a student’s instruction was geared toward a socialization process, whereby, the individual student learned proper social values, such as formal social discourse, deference to superiors, and traditional rituals.[v]
Instruction culminated in a high stakes final “examination” that served as the gateway to a social title and a position in the state bureaucracy.[vi] This East Asian educational system produced a small population of literate and cultured elites, trained in a traditional and largely unchanging body of ethical and technical knowledge. The literate elite served as the administrative center of the Chinese empire. This elite “enjoyed unrivalled authority and numerous privileges”[vii] because they effectively ran the empire by implementing the demands of the emperors. This caste of educated elites was higher in status than all other social classes, including military leaders, merchants, and priests.
The Communist revolution of the 1950s did not displace the standing of the educated elite in China, nor did it diminish the cultural importance of learning. However, the revolution did temporarily replace the venerated texts of Confucius with those written by communist leaders, such as Marx and Mao. In many ways, the communist revolution was co-opted by the previous imperial bureaucracy. The state remained the paternalist center of an imperial empire, but there was a political shift away from hereditary monarchs towards the somewhat more open structure of the communist party, which supplanted the monarchs as the ruling authority.[viii]
Chinese communism was a very “pragmatic” blend of imperial bureaucratic tradition, communist ideology, and market activity.[ix] Chinese leaders began to move further away from communist ideology towards capitalist economic development in 1978, albeit a form of state directed capitalism, starting with a few “special economic zones,” which eventually served as a model for the rest of the country.[x] Due to these economic reforms, the economic growth rate accelerated considerably, moving from 4-5 percent during Mao’s administration to a yearly rate of 9.5 percent from 1978 to 1992.[xi]
The economic turn toward capitalism also ushered in a cultural transformation as well. The Chinese people began to “worship wealth” and celebrate entrepreneurs, just like their counterparts in the capitalist western world.[xii] As the political scientist Martin Jacques has explained, “Money-making, meanwhile, has replaced politics as the most valued and respected form of social activity, including within the [communist] Party itself.”[xiii]
Communist Party leaders have set a new example for the rest of the nation. They are highly educated, many with western university degrees, and they participate in market activities. These leaders also often engage in corruption, exploiting state power to privately enrich themselves and their families. Over 92 percent of central committee Party members have earned a college degree, many in technical subjects. Most have used their political standing and connections to engage in entrepreneurial and investment activities, much of which would be considered corruption. The former Prime Minister, Wen Jiabao, reportedly enabled his extended family to amass a fortune of over $2.7 billion dollars.[xiv] In 2011 alone, close to 143,000 Party officials were accused of illegal activity, which led to “the recovery of 8.4 billion Yuan ($1.35 billion) in assets.”[xv]
The traditional veneration of education and credentials has only intensified in the 21st century. China produces more college graduates than any other country, around 4.5 million in 2007 alone. This was up from approximately 950,000 college graduates in 2000, an increase of over 470 percent![xvi] And the numbers keep going up. Now, there are close to 8 million college graduates a year, including both community colleges and universities. A growing fraction of these college students attended and/or graduated from western universities. By 2020, China anticipates having 195 million college graduates, compared to the United States, which expects to have only 120 million.[xvii]
The Chinese government has been investing around $250 billion a year in its educational system, encouraging more and more students to attend college and earn degrees. Over the last decade, the number of colleges and universities in China had doubled, now numbering 2,409.[xviii]
The demand for college credentials in China has increased exponentially, but the quality of Chinese institutions of higher education has been low and their management “dysfunctional.”[xix] However, due to increased state investment and regulations, Chinese universities are becoming stronger. Hu Jintao, the President of China, has admitted that “While people receive a good education, there are significant gaps compared with the advanced international level.”[xx]
Part of the problem with Chinese higher education is the lack of professors trained in research, leadership, and academic ethics.[xxi] A generation ago, there were not many college graduates, especially researchers with postgraduate degrees. With the exponential increase in Chinese colleges and universities, there have not been enough highly qualified college graduates to serve as professors. And the pay is not great. The average professor earns only the equivalent of $300 a month, which is less than many skilled laborers. Many professors become entrepreneurs out of necessity, turning to the labor market for second jobs or to start a company.[xxii]
In 2010, no mainland Chinese universities were ranked in the top 30 internationally, but six mainland Chinese universities were ranked in the top 200, up from only five in 2004. The United States, by contrast, has the most developed and highest ranked universities in the world. Seven of the top ten universities in the world are in the U.S., the other three are in the U.K. The allure of a degree from a top-ranked university has caused more and more Chinese students to study abroad in the U.S. and U.K. During the 2003-04 school-year, there were approximately 128,000 Chinese students studying in the U.S., and another 75,000 studying in the U.K. These numbers have been steadily increasing over the past decade, albeit with some fluctuation during the Great Recession of 2008-10.[xxiii]
Chinese students studying abroad make up 17 percent of the total amount of international students globally. In 2010, there were approximately 562,889 Chinese international students. The top destinations were the U.S., Australia, Japan, the U.K., and Korea. The U.S. is the most popular destination globally for international students, hosting approximately 19 percent of all such students.[xxiv]
But there is a dark side the educational boom in China. For one, there is widespread corruption and fraud, by both students and professors. Philip Altbach tentatively noted that “such corruption seems embedded in [Chinese] academe.”[xxv] One recent study conducted by researchers from Beijing University found that Chinese students and professors had “little or no idea” about “academic ethics and misconduct.” Approximately 40 percent of students admitted that current policies did not deter widespread cheating and fraud.[xxvi] Unethical behavior in higher education mirrors widespread unethical behavior in the larger society, especially in politics and business, perhaps signaling a sort of break down in traditional ethical principles due to the momentous social transformation from a socialist to a capitalist society.[xxvii]
In order to quickly graduate and get low-skilled government jobs, many students don’t care about learning or the quality of their academic work. University students are plagiarizing established information from published sources or simply fabricating research results. Graduate students steal research from their colleagues, publishing the data before the authors’ can write up their report. Some hire ghost-writers to research and write graduate thesis papers and dissertations. A master’s thesis in English costs around 20,000 Yuan, cheaper if it is written in Chinese. You can even pay some academic journals to have your work published. Some ghostwriting businesses offer to both write your paper and get it published![xxviii] One Chinese student explained, “No one likes writing papers. It is meaningless and just a technicality before graduation. Most teachers are acquiescent."[xxix] Some graduate students just buy their degrees from corrupt higher education officials or from fake schools, often referred to as diploma mills.[xxx] Sometimes, students have to bribe university officials just to get accepted. One student with adequate test scores was asked to pay a $12,000 bribe in order to be admitted to a university.[xxxi]
Professors are also engaging in academic fraud, perhaps setting bad examples, which their students eagerly follow. More than a few professors have lied about their qualifications, falsely claiming non-existent degrees or falsely claiming published papers or books. A couple of professors have falsely claimed to be the authors of research papers published in the west. At least a few unscrupulous professors have just copied previously published papers and then re-submitted the work to another journal, falsely claiming original authorship of someone else’s paper.[xxxii] At least one professor, Lu Jun, who was hired by Beijing University of Chemical Technology, admitted to completely falsifying his entire resume, lying about not only his degrees, but also his work experience and published work. He simply copied information from the resumes of western professors and then claimed it all on his own.[xxxiii]
Western universities have been experimenting with collaborative ventures, offering a western style university education taught by visiting professors and sanctioned by the prestige of western university standards. Universities such as Yale, Columbia, and Arizona State University offer higher education programs in China, but students earn a western degree. However, widespread academic fraud and corruption have strained these endeavors. Students lie about academic credentials and research, and they routinely plagiarize and cheat. One Yale professor explained, “When a student I am teaching steals words and ideas from an author without acknowledgment, I feel cheated…I ask myself, why should I teach people who knowingly deceive me?”[xxxiv]
Chinese academic fraud is also affecting international students and their host countries. Western institutions of higher education want to attract international students for a number of reasons. These students enhance a school’s diversity, it builds brand recognition and loyalty in developing countries, and international students pay full tuition, often at higher rates that domestic students.[xxxv] Such calculations can often devolve into a type of fraudulent academic capitalism, whereby western universities sell their brand, and the lure of a prestigious degree, to unprepared students who do not have the foundational knowledge or skills to successfully pass western university classes.
But not all international students are victims. Many students lie, cheat, and buy their way into western universities. Approximately 80 percent of Chinese international students hire an agent to prepare the application materials to apply to a western university. These agents are paid up to $10,000 for their services. Many of these agents not only fraudulently fill out the application, lying about educational credentials, skills, and references, but these agents also write the students application essays, lying about the student’s experience and misrepresenting students’ foreign language proficiency. One consultancy group researching such agencies estimates that most of the information on Chinese student applications is fraudulent: 90 percent of recommendation letters, 70 percent of application essays, and 50 percent of high school transcripts are fake.[xxxvi]
An educational researcher from the U.S. warned, "The problem is massive. There's no oversight in China, no control over who can set up an agency, over what the agency can and can't do…[These agencies] help in creating fraudulent documents."[xxxvii] One Australian research group explained, “unscrupulous education agents on impossibly high commissions” are “funneling students with fraudulent documents into any course irrespective of the quality of the course or the student.”[xxxviii] The Chinese government has finally recognized this problem and is starting to take steps to regulate these college application agencies.
But unscrupulous Chinese students and entrepreneurs are not the only people engaged in academic capitalism. As already noted, American institutions of higher education are also exploiting students for brand expansion and economic gain. But a new class of fraudulent for-profit colleges, which are often referred to as “diploma mills,” have sprung up in the U.S. to take advantage of gullible Chinese exchange students. Some of these fraudulent organizations have been set up by former Chinese nationals who have used their knowledge of Chinese education to better exploit eager international students. Dickson State University admitted unqualified international students, 95 percent of whom came from China, and awarded them fraudulent degrees.[xxxix] Herguan University and Tri-Valley University, both located in the San Francisco Bay Area, preyed upon Chinese exchange students and generated millions in illicit profits, until U.S. officials began to investigate these fraudulent organizations.[xl]
A newer type of academic capitalism has recently emerged in China, which is a hybrid form of Chinese entrepreneurialism and western higher education.[xli] The Chinese government designates these ventures as “duli” or “independent institutions.” Luxi Zhang and Bob Adamson, professors at The Hong Kong Institute of Education, explain, “The Ministry of Education stated that an independent institution should be run by entrepreneurs, following the principle of ‘seven independences’: independent campus and basic facilities, relatively independent teaching and administrative staffing, independent student enrolment, independent certification, independent finance budgeting, independent legal entity and independent civil responsibilities.”[xlii]
One variant of this new phenomenon is the international university summer school. Chinese capitalists have created undergraduate “summer school” programs hosted at Chinese universities, but usually not officially connected to, or sponsored by, the university. These programs target mostly international students who return home to China during the summer, although some also target western undergraduates looking to study abroad. But unlike other forms of academic capitalism in China, these organizations hire western university professors and lecturers who teach western style classes.[xliii]
These programs claim that students can take credits from these summer schools back to the U.S. and earn transfer credit from U.S. universities. Most of these programs operate on the campus of various Chinese universities, and some actually use the name of host universities; however, these summer schools are actually just private businesses renting classrooms, ostensibly using the university location to provide a veneer of academic legitimacy.[xliv]
These programs are mostly run by young Chinese businessmen who have been educated in western universities. Some of these entrepreneurs are still registered undergraduate students at U.S. universities, taking time off from school to develop their own business. These young entrepreneurs secure funding from Chinese capitalists and run their summer school businesses like franchises, spinning off affiliated programs in new cities, most likely earning a percentage of profits for new programs. As The Chronicle of Higher Education recently explained, “These entrepreneurs have taken an American product—the Western college course—and created a shorter, cheaper version to sell to their peers. In doing so, they have tapped into the seemingly insatiable demand for Western education by China's growing middle class.”[xlv]
Besides the convenience of taking western university courses back home in China, these programs also offer western credit hours at substantially lower prices than exchange students would be paying at U.S. universities. As one Chinese student explained, “If summer school provides me the credits and it's cheaper, why not choose that?" According to another international student, these programs seem to attract two different types of students: “Those who want to finish college as soon as possible, they work very hard. Another group, they can't finish the courses in their own school, and they think summer school will be easy.”
There is evidence to suggest that some of these schools engage in deceptive practices, similar in type of broader forms of fraud and unethical behavior documented in the larger Chinese marketplace.[xlvi] Profit hungry administrators at these for-profit schools don’t seem to be screening applicants to differentiate serious students from others who just want to buy cheap credits.[xlvii] Some of these schools, as I’ll explain in the next chapter, give students financial incentives to take as many classes as possible, which set up most students to fail – or puts pressure on faculty to just pass all students. One U.S. professor criticized these summer schools for undermining the integrity of western institutions of higher education: "Essentially what Summer China did was create a cheap, Chinese program. I was providing an inexpensive product students could buy in lieu of better developed courses back home [in the U.S.]."[xlviii]
With some much scheming and fraud in Chinese higher education, by faculty, students, and businessmen, it seems insightful to ask, what is Chinese higher education for? If these institutions were actually imparting real skills and knowledge that were to be usefully employed in Chinese society and in the economy, then cracking down on academic fraud would be a pertinent policy issue. But if high education is simply a status marker of prestige, a mindless social ritual that serves as a gateway into the Chinese state bureaucracy, then why not just buy a credential, or steal it?
For thousands of years in China, education has been reduced to a commodity, mere social capital, and it is prized not for its utility, but because of its exclusivity, like a luxury good. As such, it should come as no surprise that educational credentials are bought and sold like any other commodity. Further, like most other luxury goods in China, educational credentials are easy to fake. Selling fake credentials is simply one more black-market activity, a mundane expansion of China’s seemingly limitless sea of counterfeit goods.
CHINA X: Educational Opportunity or Fraud?
CHINA X[xlix] International Summer School was created in 2011 on the campus of Qingdao University in Qingdao, Shandong province, which is located on the central-east coast of China. The purpose of the program was to invite the "world’s top professors" to China in order to teach western university classes in English. The program is mostly geared to Chinese foreign exchange students studying abroad in the United States. While home visiting their families, these students could earn transfer credits towards an American bachelor’s degree. The program claims to offer the equivalent of American college courses taught in English by American professors - for a much cheaper price.
CHINA X is a private school. It is not an official part of any university, nor is it run by local faculty. Instead, it is organized and administrated by local businessmen and hosted at prominent Chinese universities. Some of these program administrators are college students in their mid-twenties. CHINA X is a franchise business. Each locale is independently organized and operated. There seems to be no centralized coordination or oversight, although all campuses share a single website. In 2012 the CHINA X program expanded into two more cities in China: Southwest Jiaotong University in Chengdu and Jinan University in Guangzhou. In 2013 the program will reportedly spread to Beijing and Taiwan.
In its first year, there were around 200 students accepted into the program. By 2012, around 400 to 500 students enrolled between the three campuses. Most students were Chinese exchange students who have already been accepted for undergraduate study in American universities. Many of these students were freshmen or sophomores already studying abroad, some from prominent U.S. universities, like the University of Wisconsin, Syracuse University, and the University of California. Most of these students had come home to China for summer vacation in order to see family. Some of the students were recent graduates from local Chinese high schools. Students who pass CHINA X courses earn credits that supposedly can transfer to "over 200 American colleges," although only 35 universities are listed on the website. The program is not just academic. It also offers non-credit classes on dance, rock-n-roll, and yachting, as well as on-campus dormitories and social activities, like dance parties and field trips.
The CHINA X program has a highly ambitious, and potentially contradictory, vision. The mission statement of the program is published on its website, both in English and Chinese. It claims,
“Cooperating with more groundbreaking Chinese and American universities, CHINA X International Summer School is devoted to constructing the best summer program in Greater China, building an international high-end platform for the elite students community, well-known professors and Fortune 500 companies.”
There seem to be several different, and possibly conflicting, goals here. One part of the CHINA X mission seems to be to foster international cooperation between Chinese and American universities through cultural exchange. Another goal seems to be a competitive educational and/or business vision to create "the best" university summer school in China for "elite students" at the "lowest cost among peer programs across the world." And finally, there is another goal, only half-articulated, which seems to be an aspiration to be a business school. It is not clear if this program wants to attract funding or guest speakers from "Fortune 500 companies," or if CHINA X aspires to be a global corporation, like most Fortune 500 companies.
I want to look at each of these goals, one by one. Did this program foster international cooperation between Chinese and American universities? Did this program hire the "world's top professors" in order to create a superior university summer program for "elite" students? Was this program seeking to become an international business school, or did it aspire to be a global corporation?
I evaluated the claims made on the CHINA X website with three sources of data: my observation of this program in Guangzhou during the summer of 2012, discussions with other American faculty members who taught in this program, and interviews with support staff. I concluded that this program does not foster much international cooperation, and what little cooperation did take place was marred by economic exploitation. It does not recruit "top" professors, nor does it recruit "elite" students. And the program does not offer superior university courses. The program did focus on business and economics, but was not a coherent business school. And finally, CHINA X was a for-profit enterprise that seemed to focus on maximizing profit, not maximizing education or student learning, and towards this end, the program may have committed academic fraud.
First, did this program foster international cooperation? Yes, there were some forms of international cooperation; however, it was mostly between faculty and support staff. One Chinese professor from the business school gave a speech on the first day, but was never seen again. Another Chinese professor from the business school attended a few of the public speaking classes. No other Chinese professors participated in the program. Students attended classes, but rarely, if ever, talked to professors outside of class. Most did not do much speaking in class. Some students also attended field trips and social events, but there was rarely any mixing with professors, outside of occasional small talk. The only real exchange was between faculty and the sixteen support staff, all of whom were local students at Jinan University, and many of whom were graduate students. Faculty members were dependent upon these students for help, both with classes and with navigating the culture. Supposedly there were "research" opportunities to collaborate with Chinese colleagues, but nothing was ever said of this opportunity once we arrived, and no American faculty had any contact with the local professors.
While there was collaboration and exchange with the support staff, it was not collaboration between equals. Sadly, these staff members were being economically exploited by the program, as are many workers in China. There were two types of support staff: teaching assistants and living assistants. Teaching assistants, like their counterparts in American universities, were mostly graduate students who attended classes, lead recitation sections, and helped professors proctor exams and grade assignments. Living assistants were both graduate and undergraduate students who helped professors interact with the local culture, which included help with shopping, dining, banking, sightseeing, and issues with living quarters.
These students served an important role, but they were not being compensated fairly for their work. Over the five-week program, the TAs would work between 15 to 30 hours a week, while the living assistants would work between 5 to 10 hours a week. Both groups were required to be on call day and night to help professors when needed. And they were required to put in extra hours as service workers during program events and parties. For this all this effort, TAs earned 700-500 Yuan, which is the equivalent of $80-$122 for five weeks. Thus, for 75 to 150 hours of work over five weeks, TAs earned the equivalent of $0.53 to $1.63 an hour. Worse, the living assistants were paid nothing at all.
Almost all of the assistants I interviewed said they were not treated fairly by the program. One TA said the working conditions were "terrible" and that "I did not feel like I was valued." Another TA said "the payment is abnormal in the market," which meant that the CHINA X wages were low, even by the extremely low standards of the Chinese labor market. But this student didn't complain. She was the only respondent to consider her treatment fair because she was able to take free classes by American professors, which she valued more than a decent salary. She said, "I don’t really care about the salary. I join the program because there are relevant courses that I want to learn. So, I tend to participate it even there’s no payment."
Clearly, these students joined the program for non-monetary rewards, but the CHINA X administrators seemed to exploit these motivations. All Chinese undergraduates need to take an internship for school, thus, working for CHINA X fulfilled this requirement. Some students also saw this as an opportunity to make connections with American faculty who might help them later study abroad in the U.S. But rather than treat support staff as volunteers and students, they were treated as menial workers who were expected to be on call for duty at all hours of the day.
While CHINA X didn't foster much by way of international cooperation, how about its second claim: Did it hire the "world's top professors" in order to create a superior university summer program for "elite" students? On all three parts of this claim the answer is unequivocally negative. CHINA X did not hire "top professors" by any standard way of measuring such a claim. The program was inferior in every way to an American college course, although it was potentially much cheaper. And the program certainly did not admit "elite" students.
First, who were the professors? The website claims that CHINA X has "the best line-up of professors in Asia." It claims that professors come from highly acclaimed tier-1 research universities in America and England, like Harvard University, The University of California at Berkeley, and University of Cambridge. The program also claims that professors are focused on "improving the quality of learning and teaching," "curriculum design," and "pedagogical innovations." Some of the visiting professors did in fact work at internationally recognized, top-tier American universities, like the University of California at Berkeley. But the vast majority did not. Most of the professors came from mid- to low-ranked American state universities, like the University of Texas at San Antonio or Arlington, the University of Wisconsin at Platteville, or the University of Minnesota at Crookston.
Few, if any, of the professors were tenured full-professors, and none were leaders in any academic field. Only a small minority of the visiting professors had done any original research or published academic work. Some of the "professors" were not even professors at all. Around half of the faculty were adjunct lecturers, some only partly affiliated with universities, as they taught primarily at community colleges in the United States. Many of these adjunct faculty had only master’s degrees and not much experience teaching at the university level. In several instances, the program website lied about the credentials of some of these professors, claiming they had earned PhDs (when they had not), and claiming they worked at more prestigious universities.
Few of the professors knew anything about curriculum or instruction and there was little, if any, "curriculum design" or "pedagogical innovation." Most professors simply lectured to students, assigned readings from the course textbook, used high stakes exams, and a few assigned academic papers. While the quality of "learning and teaching" in any university naturally varies from class to class, depending on both the professor and the students, at this summer program there was no evidence of any exceptional teaching or innovative pedagogical techniques. In fact, just the opposite. Most offered very traditional classes. Thus, the claims of "the best line-up of professors in Asia" and “pedagogical innovations” were clearly false. And the claim that all professors came from prominent tier-1 American research universities was grossly overstated and misleading.
What about the program? Did CHINA X offer a superior university summer program? A good university program would have innovative and demanding university classes that reinforce core learning goals, the program would be coherently integrated and well organized, and it would provide adequate student support services to ensure quality learning. CHINA X did not display any of these characteristics. The classes were standard, lecture and exam-oriented college classes taught by, at best, adequate instructors. Most classes did not demand much time and effort from students, outside of preparing for exams. There were no core learning goals or outcomes for the program. The classes were not integrated in any way. The program was poorly organized. Decision making was reactive, rather than proactive, with many modifications made on the fly as problems arose.
And there were almost no student support services: computers in classrooms were slow and infected with viruses, there was only one printer in the faculty lounge, the library did not have access to English language academic databases, there were few English language books, and there was no writing and learning facility to help tutor students. Several faculty noted the absence of a writing and learning lab because most students struggled with their reading and writing skills. A hastily organized "writing center" opened halfway through the five-week program. It was staffed by one novice English instructor for a couple hours a day, and it could not accommodate even a fraction of the students who needed such services.
But the program was relatively cheap, in comparison with non-resident tuition at American universities. Including fees and free books, one CHINA X class was $2,450 (15,680 Yuan), which at the low end of typical out-of-state tuition for an American public university, which cost around $1,500 to $7,000 for a three-credit class, depending if the university is a lower-tier or a tier-one institution. Essentially, students were paying for a lower-tier American university education and that is exactly what they were getting, with the exception, of course, of the condensed 5-week structure. Such short classes severely constricted the amount of information and assessment students received, thus, students were being sold a false bill of goods and left classes with little “higher education,” in terms of either knowledge or skills.
CHINA X also gave students financial incentives to take as many classes as possible. If a student registers for two or more classes, each additional class is only an additional $400 to $500. And this includes free books, albeit the books are pirated photocopies of American textbooks. Many students registered for three or four classes (at least a couple registered for five!). There is no way these students did any more than memorize short-term information to pass standardized, high-stakes exams. Several students had to eventually drop out of classes (and lose their money) because there was no way for them to be successful with such an unrealistic load of classes.
And finally, what about the students? Did CHINA X admit "elite" students? Well, the answer to this question is mixed, yes and no. Any exchange student who enrolls in a foreign language university to earn a degree should be considered an "elite" student due to the difficulty of mastering a second language on top of the knowledge requirements of a university degree program. However, there have been many studies about sub-standard educational practices in Chinese schools and the struggles of foreign-exchange students in American universities. These reports raise doubts about how prepared these students are for a western university degree programs. Further, there have been recent investigative reports about Chinese students engaging agents to apply to western universities. These agents not only fill out the college application, but also have been known to lie about students’ qualifications and to write the application essay for the student. While some of the students enrolled in CHINA X were absolutely "elite" students, many were not.
Most CHINA X students were not fluent in English speaking, reading, and writing and they struggled to successfully pass intense five-week college courses. Under ideal circumstances, with a low class-load, trained teachers, and adequate student support services, most of these students could have developed their English skills and mastered course material. But CHINA X did not provide ideal circumstances. Most professors had no knowledge of pedagogy, they used class only to lecture, and few met with students outside of class to help them learn. Some professors used class time to go on “field trips,” which were no more than tours of local sites that had, at best, moderate connection to the course curriculum. As already noted, there were almost no student support services. And students had low expectations of easy and cheap college courses, so many enrolled for three, four, even five courses at once. Under such circumstances, there was little student learning.
Students struggled to meet the workload requirements and usually studied only before exams. Many had difficulty understanding verbal English and so they sat quietly in class, taking fractured notes, starting at the walls, or playing on their computers. Many students also had difficulty reading in English, which limited their ability to understand their textbooks, especially in the reading-heavy courses of literature and philosophy. Many students also routinely plagiarized ideas and wording from their textbooks.
The American professors seemed to have low expectations. Most seemed to treat their stay in China as a vacation, rather than a serious academic endeavor. Some dealt with poor student performance by grading on curves, setting the academic bar fairly low. Most professors passed every student, even though few of these students possessed the English skills to pass a real university level course in the United States. The few professors who pushed students to learn, and who eventually failed some students, were pressured to lower their standards, change grades, and pass all students. There was even some evidence that grades were tampered with. Two of the CHINA X support staff said that administrators may have changed professor's final grades so that all students in the program would pass classes.
Looking past the false rhetoric of the mission statement, the CHINA X program seemed to have only one goal: It wanted to attract a lot of students to take many classes so that program administrators could make a large profit. CHINA X did focus on business and economics, around 40% of the total classes offered, but it did not create a coherent business school model. Instead, the program offered a diverse variety of core freshman and sophomore classes in a range of disciplines, which was meant to attract a wide variety of students. It also offered a price plan that was meant to encourage students to take multiple classes. All of the support staff that I interviewed agreed that the primary goal of CHINA X was to make a profit.
CHINA X is a for-profit enterprise that is clearly focused on maximizing profit, not maximizing education. The enterprise forfeited not only educational values in the pursuit of profit, but it broke the law as well. Most of the professors were surprised when they were told to enter the country on a tourist visa, rather than a work visa. The program administrators explained that it was just easier that way, as there was a lot of red tape to hire foreign workers. While plausible, it turns out that most Chinese educational institutions do in fact apply for work visas for foreign staff, and they are not all that hard to get approved. Professors found it a bit more shocking to be paid in cash. They were given large stacks of American dollars in incremental stages. This method of payment gave the whole operation a gangster-like feel.
CHINA X had a clear, for-profit mission, which was at odds with its stated mission published on its website. When asked, the support staff agreed: this was a business, not a school. One staff member stated, "It was clear that the directors didn't care much about the quality of education." Another explained why, "This program is a business to make profit."
Towards its profit-driven end, CHINA X exploits support staff, students, and visiting professors. Most participants were manipulated with false or misleading information. Students were sold a false bill of goods. They did not receive a top-notch American university education from highly regarded American professors. They were provided no support services to help them learn. And they were encouraged to take more classes than they could successfully pass. They were also not told that many American universities would not accept CHINA X courses for transfer credit.
Perhaps more worrisome, the CHINA X program seems to have engaged in deliberate academic fraud by altering the final grades of professors so that all students could pass classes. Students may have also been complicit in the fraud if they were promised easy credits with the guarantee of passing.
The academic community in the U.S. and in the rest of the world needs to be aware of profit-driven programs, such as CHINA X, so as to guard against a breach in the academic integrity of the western university system. Programs such as CHINA X seem to be selling college credits, rather than offering quality higher education. Such programs also tarnish the integrity of visiting faculty and foreign exchange students who travel abroad.
Conclusion: What Is the Value of Higher Education in China?
For thousands of years, the value of higher education in China has not been intrinsic. The value and utility of a college credential has rested upon one distinguishing characteristic: it is an unobtainable good that most cannot afford. It was used solely as a status symbol, a credential signaling exclusivity. As historian of education David F. Labaree argued, schooling is often reduced to a commodity: it is “a kind of ‘cultural currency’ that can be exchanged for social position and worldly success.”[l] Schools offer, according to Thomas Frank, the “golden ticket” to success, thus, universities offer the “capital-C Credential.”[li] In such a cultural environment, real learning is not important. Instead, “surrogate learning” is all that’s needed. As Michael W. Sedlak explained, “As long as the tests are passed, credits are accumulated, and credentials are awarded, what occurs in most classrooms is allowed to pass for education.”[lii]
And often, as philosopher Matthew B. Crawford points out, where such social rituals displace real learning, an educational credential “serves only to obscure a more real stupidifictaion.”[liii] Rather than make a person smart, by imparting real knowledge and skills, schools often make people stupid, by incapacitating them through mindless ritual and deference to authority. Higher education in China is more like virtual education, rather than the acquisition of higher order skills and knowledge through real learning. For centuries, higher education in China has been a social marker of legitimation, a mere gatekeeping function. Higher education has served the imperial bureaucracy for centuries, certifying an administrative class of deferential servants. It has the same basic function today.
But the enduring problem of all luxury goods, especially in vibrant, unregulated marketplaces like China, is the ability of entrepreneurs to cheaply replicate fakes, flooding the marketplace with worthless replicas and deflating the value of luxury goods through a crises of identity. China has long been known for its industrious ability to produce cheap knock-offs of designer goods. There is evidence to suggest that deceptive practices, including the selling of fraudulent merchandise, are perfectly acceptable in the Chinese business world.[liv] The Economist sardonically notes, “You could almost say that counterfeits remain Silk Street’s trademark, despite the market’s efforts to stamp them out.”[lv]
The marketplace for educational credentials has been no different.[lvi] If all have access to a luxury good, then it can’t be a luxury anymore. If more and more people have the capital-C Credential of higher education, then how can elites visibly identify superiority? The fake good eventually becomes exposed and devalued, and elites move on to the next luxury marker of higher social status, perhaps to goods that are not so easily knocked-off, like cars, foreign travel, and real estate.
Higher education has always been traditionally reserved for an elite upper class. It was meant to be exclusive and to serve as a social signal legitimating elite status because it was guarded by elite institutions and conferred only by elaborate social rituals. But the democratization of western society in the 19th and 20th centuries corroded the exclusivity of traditional elite institutions, such as political governance, schooling, and the market place. These democratizing currents were at first forced on eastern nations, such as Japan and China, due to the western world’s insatiable appetite for new markets to buy raw materials and sell manufactured goods. But eventually, the public at large in south-east Asia and Japan began to demand more and more democratization, albeit blending western ideas and institutions with traditional eastern ways of life.
In the early 20th century, the economist Joseph Schumpeter foresaw how democratization would produce a credential arms race and would result in the devaluation of higher education. He was writing at a time when only a small minority of people went to college, but policy makers were heatedly discussing the opening of higher education to larger swaths of the middle class. Schumpeter warned that the supply of credentialed workers would outpace labor market demand. Flooding the market with credentialed workers would devalue the signaling function of degrees, thereby, reducing the social capital of all degree holders. This devaluation of credentials would thus condemn the previously elite class of college graduates into a netherworld of over-education and “substandard work.”[lvii]
It would be instructive to step back and ask, why are Chinese students so focused on earning college degrees? What will they do with this luxury of exclusive social capital? In 2012 approximately 7 million students graduated with a college degree in China, but there were no jobs for many of this credentialed class. Due to the constrained possibilities and fierce competition of the private market, around 1.4 million of these students applied for the government civil service exams, a massive increase from the previous decade, but there were only 20,800 positions to fill.[lviii] Some turned to state-run corporations, and a lucky few found work abroad. But many college graduates were forced into low-paid work in factories, the emerging service sector, or in small, local, mostly family-owned businesses.
And for the lucky college graduates who find a government job? Do they get a life of privilege and ease? The Economist paints a different portrait: “Mr Zhang, who is 27, is beginning his climb up the bureaucracy in the capital of a province, Shanxi, south-west of Beijing, which is reputed to be among the most corrupt and least competently governed. The jobs are hard to get, says Mr Zhang, but they are not the cushy sinecures that many assume. He works from 8am until midnight on most days, he says, compiling dry reports on topics like coal production and sales for higher-level officials. He commands a modest salary by urban standards—about 2,800 Yuan ($450) a month, in a city where a decent flat near his office rents for two-thirds that much. This way of life does not impress the ladies, he says; he has been on two blind dates in four years, both of them failures. This picture of dedication and loneliness stands in sharp contrast to the popular image.”[lix]
But isn’t a position like Mr Zhang’s just a starting point, an entry-level job with which one could work their way up the ladder to success? Sadly, no. As The Economist goes on to explain, “The chance of advancement is small indeed. Of China’s 6.9m civil servants, about 900,000 are, like Mr Zhang, at the lowest official rung of government above entry-level. Roughly 40,000 civil servants serve at the city or ‘bureau’ level. Many promotions are handed out on the basis of relationships, gifts and the outright sale of offices. Even when they compete for promotions on merit, some officials will pad their CVs with fake graduate degrees.”[lx]
And Mr Zhang is not alone. A reporter for The New York Times interviewed a young community college graduate, Wang Zengsong. Mr Zengsong is 25 years old. He grew up in the country on a rice farm, but he managed to go to community college and earn a three-year associates degree. But ever since graduating, now over three years, he has been mostly unemployed. He has only had a couple of short-term, low-paying jobs, such as a security guard at a shopping mall and a waiter in a restaurant. There are factory jobs, but Mr Zengsong won’t apply for those. Why? As the Times reporter explains, “He will not consider applying for a full-time factory job because Mr. Wang, as a college graduate, thinks that is beneath him. Instead, he searches every day for an office job, which would initially pay as little as a third of factory wages. ‘I have never and will never consider a factory job — what’s the point of sitting there hour after hour, doing repetitive work?’ he asked. Millions of recent college graduates in China like Mr. Wang are asking the same question.”[lxi]
There is now widespread “over-education” in China because the labor market does not have enough high-skill positions for all the graduates leaving college each year.[lxii] In 2012, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao noted that only 78 percent of graduates from the year before had found a job. There is a persistent “structural mismatch,” as the deputy secretary general of China’s Education Ministry has acknowledged: Too many college graduates and not enough good jobs. The situation is not any better for students with postgraduate degrees.[lxiii] And not only are many college graduates unemployed, under-employed, and desperately looking for work, but those college graduates who do have jobs are seeing their wages erode, as a flood of skilled laborers devalue the market. This leaves many college graduates with a difficult choice: work in a factory or go back home to live with parents.[lxiv]
The problem of credentialism and over-education is not only affecting China. It is happening in the U.S. too. It is a global problem. One has to ask, what good is an education if there is no way to use such an education to live a better life? If higher education has been reduced to a credential that signals elite status, then why not just buy one, legitimate or fake? But what happens when the labor market is flooded with bought degrees that signal no real learning or skills? What happens when technological development and the globalized economy creatively destroy old industries and create new ones?
Those who see higher education as nothing more than a credential leave themselves exposed to the mercies of the global labor market. There is a lot that can be said about the intrinsic value of knowledge, skills, and personal development. But leaving all that aside, and simply focusing on the labor market value of a college degree, which is what most people seem to be doing in the world, there is a frightful consequence of credentialism.
If the individual does not actually purchase real knowledge and skills that can be creatively and purposefully used in the marketplace, then they offer employers nothing other than a piece of paper signaling exclusivity. But if a growing minority, or even a majority, of people possess that same piece of paper, then its sole signaling purpose ceases to function and it becomes devalued, if not completely devoid of value. At such a point, the individual becomes completely helpless as an un-skilled laborer, potentially much worse off because the college students has spent tens of thousands of dollars, at least, to purchase a now worthless credential. What would be the national and global consequence of such a dismal situation?
We will most likely find out over the coming decades.
Endnotes
[i] Martin Jacques, When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of a New Global Order (New York, 2012), 248.
[ii] James B. Palais, “Confucianism and the Aristocratic/ Bureaucratic Balance in Korea,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 44, no. 2 (Dec 1984): 427-68.
[iii] Jacques, When China Rules the World, 15.
[iv] Fredrick W. Mote, Intellectual Foundations of China (New York: Knopf, 1971); Jacques, When China Rules the World, 96.
[v] Michael Charles Kalton, The Neo-Confucian World View and Value System of Yi Dynasty Korea (Diss., Harvard University, Sept 1977), 6, 7, 9, 82; Jacques, When China Rules the World, 96.
[vi] Jacques, When China Rules the World, 96; Philip G. Altbach, “The Giants Awake: Higher Education Systems in China and India,” Economic and Political Weekly, 44, No. 23 (Jun. 6 - 12, 2009), 39-51.
[vii] Ibid.
[viii] Ibid.
[ix] Ibid., 176.
[x] Ibid.
[xi] Ibid., 177.
[xii] Ibid., 179.
[xiii] Ibid., 282.
[xiv] “China’s Ruling Families: Riches Exposed,” The Economist (Nov 3, 2012), Retrieved from www.economist.com
[xv] “The Fight Against Corruption,” The Economist (Dec 8, 2012), Retrieved from www.economist.com
[xvi] Jacques, When China Rules the World, Ibid., 217.
[xvii] Keith Bradsher, “Next Made-in-China Boom: College Graduates,” The New York Times (Jan 16, 2013), Retrieved from www.nytimes.com
[xviii] Ibid.
[xix] Altbach, “The Giants Awake: Higher Education Systems in China and India,” Ibid., 42.
[xx] Bradsher, “Next Mand-in-China Boom,” Ibid.
[xxi] Altbach, “The Giants Awake: Higher Education Systems in China and India,” Ibid., 46.
[xxii] Bradsher, “Next Mand-in-China Boom,” Ibid.
[xxiii] Jacques, When China Rules the World, Ibid., 547-48.
[xxiv] “Global Flow of Tertiary-Level Students,” UNESCO Institute for Statistics, UNESCO.org (2012), Retrieved from http://www.uis.unesco.org/EDUCATION/Pages/international-student-flow-viz.aspx
[xxv] Altbach, “The Giants Awake: Higher Education Systems in China and India,” Ibid., 47.
[xxvi] “Chinese Students Admit to Little or No Idea about Ethics,” The Times Higher Education Supplement (Aug 5, 2010), 11.
[xxvii] “China’s Ruling Families: Riches Exposed,” The Economist, Ibid.; “The Fight Against Corruption,” The Economist, Ibid.; Nick Lee, Amanda Beatson, Tony C. Garrett, Ian Lings and Xi Zhang, “A Study of the Attitudes towards Unethical Selling Amongst Chinese Salespeople,” Journal of Business Ethics, 88, Supplement 3 (2009), 497-515.
[xxviii] Yojana Sharma, “New Academic Misconduct Laws May Not Be Adequate to Curb Cheating,” University World News Global Edition, 234 (Aug 12, 2012), Retrieved from www.universityworldnews.com; Yojana Sharma, “Regulation on Academic Fraud Hopes to Reduce Plagiarism,” University World News Global Edition, 253 (Jan 6, 2013), Retrieved from www.universityworldnews.com; “Fake Papers Are Rife at Universities,” China Daily/Asia News Network (March 8, 2010), Retrieved from www.news.asiaone.com
[xxix] As cited in “Fake Papers Are Rife at Universities,” China Daily/Asia News Network (March 8, 2010), Retrieved from www.news.asiaone.com
[xxx] Yojana Sharma, “New Academic Misconduct Laws May Not Be Adequate to Curb Cheating,” University World News Global Edition, 234 (Aug 12, 2012), Retrieved from www.universityworldnews.com; Yojana Sharma, “Regulation on Academic Fraud Hopes to Reduce Plagiarism,” University World News Global Edition, 253 (Jan 6, 2013), Retrieved from www.universityworldnews.com; “Fake Papers Are Rife at Universities,” China Daily/Asia
News Network (March 8, 2010), Retrieved from www.news.asiaone.com
[xxxi] Philip Altbach, “Stench of Rotten Fruit Fills Groves of Academe,” The Times Higher Education Supplement (Jan 21, 2005), 12.
[xxxii] Ibid.
[xxxiii] “University Sacks Prof Who Was 3 Times A Fake,” People's Daily Online (July 30, 2012), Retrieved from www.english.peopledaily.com.cn
[xxxiv] “Campus Collaboration: Foreign Universities Find Working in China Harder than They Expected,” The Economist (Jan 5, 2013), Retrieved from www. economist.com
[xxxv] Alexis Lai, “Chinese Flock to Elite U.S. Schools, CNN (November 26, 2012), Retrieved from www.cnn.com
[xxxvi] Justin Bergman, “Forged Transcripts and Fake Essays: How Unscrupulous Agents Get Chinese Students into U.S. Schools,” Time (July 26, 2012), Retrieved from www.time.com
[xxxvii] As cited in Justin Bergman, “A U.S. Degree At Any Cost,” Time (Aug 20, 2012), Retrieved from www.time.com
[xxxviii] As cited in Yojana Sharma, “Ministry Mulls Powers to Ban Student Recruitment Agents,” University World News Global Edition, 246 (November 1, 2012), Retrieved from www.universityworldnews.com
[xxxix] Ibid.
[xl] Lisa M. Krieger and Molly Vorwerck, “Sunnyvale University CEO Indicted on Visa Fraud Charges,” San Jose Mercury News (May 8, 2012), Retrieved from www. mercurynews.com
[xli] Luxi Zhang & Bob Adamson, “The New Independent Higher Education Institutions in China: Dilemmas and Challenges,” Higher Education Quarterly, 65, No. 3 (July 2011), 251–266.
[xlii] Ibid., 253.
[xliii] Beth McMurtrie and Lara Farrar, “Chinese Summer Schools Sell Quick Credits,” The Chronicle of Higher Education (January 14, 2013), Retrieved from www.chronicle.com. I was a main source of information for this article. Information from this source draws from both the published article and my own research in China.
[xliv] Ibid.
[xlv] Ibid.
[xlvi] Nick Lee, Amanda Beatson, Tony C. Garrett, Ian Lings and Xi Zhang, “A Study of the Attitudes towards Unethical Selling Amongst Chinese Salespeople,” Journal of Business Ethics, 88, Supplement 3 (2009), 497-515.
[xlvii] Ibid.
[xlviii] As cited in Ibid.
[xlix] China X is a pseudonym for a real organization that continues to operate an international summer school in southern China. This chapter is based on information gleaned from the organization’s web site, organizational documents, first-hand observation of the program, and interviews with members of the organization.
[l] David F. Labaree, How to Succeed in School without Really Learning: The Credentials Race in American Education (New Haven, 1997), 43.
[li] Thomas Frank, “A Matter of Degrees,” Harpers (Aug 2012), 4.
[lii] As cited in Labaree, How to Succeed in School without Really Learning, 44.
[liii] Matthew B. Crawford, Shop Class as Soulcraft: An Inquiry in the Value of Work (New York, 2009), 144.
[liv] Nick Lee, Amanda Beatson, Tony C. Garrett, Ian Lings and Xi Zhang, “A Study of the Attitudes towards Unethical Selling Amongst Chinese Salespeople,” Journal of Business Ethics, 88, Supplement 3 (2009), 497-515.
[lv] “Fakes and Status in China,” The Economist (June 23, 2012), Retrieved from www.economist.com
[lvi] Frank, “A Matter of Degrees.”
[lvii] Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (New York, 1942), 152.
[lviii] “The Golden Rice-Bowl,” The Economist (Nov 24, 2012), Retrieved from www.economist.com
[lix] Ibid.
[lx] Ibid.
[lxi] Keith Bradsher, “Chinese Graduates Say No Thanks to
Factory Jobs,” The New York Times (Jan 24, 2013), Retrieved from www.nytimes.com
[lxii] Dan Wang, Dian Liu, Chun Lai, “Expansion of Higher Education and the Employment Crisis: Policy Innovations in China,” On The Horizon, 20, no. 4 (2012), 336-344.
[lxiii] Yojana Sharma, “Concern Over Too Many Postgraduates as Fewer Find Jobs,” University World News Global Edition, 235 (Oct 28, 2012), Retrieved from www.universityworldnews.com
[lxiv] Bradsher, “Chinese Graduates Say No Thanks to Factory Jobs,” Ibid.